Why I Believe the Warren Commission’s Case was Fraudulent

warren commission false evidence

I am not a conspiracy theorist. By that, I mean that I don’t see conspiracies under every rock. You won’t see me writing about popular conspiracy theories like 9/11, Sandy Hook, Flight 800 or the Moon Landing. But I have a problem with the government’s case against Lee Harvey Oswald. I believe that the Dallas Police/ FBI/ Warren Commission’s case against Oswald was fraudulent.

There are several reasons why I believe this and I’d like to share those reasons with you. In my opinion, these reasons are the “smoking guns” proving Oswald’s innocence. Those reasons include the way the authorities handled Oswald. The way the authorities handled the evidence. And the way the authorities handled the witnesses.

Not the least of these reasons was that the prosecutorial system in Dallas was corrupt.

Reason # 1: The prosecutorial system in Dallas was corrupt

The authenticity of a criminal case is directly connected to the credibility of the people making it. For justice to be served, the justice system must be geared to bringing the REAL perpetrators to justice.

That was not the case during the tenure of Henry Wade as District Attorney of Dallas County. His office was only interested in conviction rates. Those rates are determined by dividing the number of convictions by the number of arrests.

In other words, if you had nine convictions out of ten arrests, you’d have a .9 or 90% conviction rate. Wade compiled a conviction rate so impressive that defense attorneys ruefully called themselves the “7 % Club.”

The problem with this system was that their interest was not necessarily in convicting the guilty party. Their goal was in convicting the person they arrested. It is important to consider this system of “police work” in understanding what happened to Oswald.

If they arrested the wrong person, it would require them to manufacture evidence against that suspect.

This is exactly what they did in Dallas County under Henry Wade’s tenure.

Wade and the police framed innocent people for crimes they did not commit

District Attorney Craig Watkins became the first black elected chief prosecutor in any Texas county back in 2006.

The new DA said the cases won under Wade were riddled with shoddy investigations. Evidence was ignored and defense lawyers were kept in the dark.
They noted that the promotion system under Wade rewarded prosecutors for high conviction rates.

Watkins and his team, found nineteen fraudulent convictions — three for murder and the rest involving rape or burglary. Cases won by Wade and two successors had those convictions overturned after DNA evidence exonerated the defendants.

Not only did Wade prosecute fraudlent cases against innocent suspects. He withheld evidence of their innocence from their defense attorneys, a violation of the law.

The case of James Lee Woodard, released after 27 years in prison for a murder DNA showed he didn’t commit. Wade’s office withheld from defense attorneys photographs of tire tracks at the crime scene that didn’t match Woodard’s car.

John Stickels, a University of Texas at Arlington criminology professor, blamed a culture of “win at all costs.”
When someone was arrested, it was assumed they were guilty,” he said. “I think prosecutors and investigators basically ignored all evidence to the contrary and decided they were going to convict these guys.

This assumption of guilt at the time of arrest was evident in the arrest of Oswald at the Texas Theater. Witness Johnny Calvin Brewer testified that during the struggle with Oswald in the Texas Theater, “I heard some of the police holler, I don’t know who it was, ‘Kill the President, will you ?’ ” ( 7 H 6 )

Sending an innocent man to the electric chair

By 1953, Henry Wade already had the city wired. Reporters treated his word as gospel, sometimes even buttressing Wade’s efforts in court with their own testimony. The Dallas Police Department and County Sheriff’s Office eagerly did his bidding.
Henry Wade’s word was gold.

Wade was able to convince a jury in 1954 to send an innocent man to the electric chair.

Wade’s office had no problem charging innocent people for crimes they did not commit. It presented evidence in such a way as to obtain a conviction by a judge or jury.

And Wade was not above tampering with jury selections. Wade wrote a manual for prosecutors in 1969 that was used for more than a decade. It gave instructions on how to keep minorities off juries.

With such a skill for framing innocent people for crimes they did not commit, the credibility of the Dallas DA’s case against Lee Harvey Oswald deserves a second look.

As does the authenticity of the evidence in this case.

But corruption didn’t just exist in the Dallas DA’s office, it was rampant in the police department as well.

Police corruption in Dallas

One form of police corruption in Dallas became evident when it was learned that officers accepted gratuities from businessmen. Jack Ruby was a strip club operator who supplied free booze, gambling and women to members of the police department.

In 1966, researcher/author/attorney Mark Lane interviewed Nancy Hamilton, formerly known as Nancy Perrin Rich. Mrs. Hamilton was a bartender at Jack Ruby’s Carousel Club. Hamilton told him that Dallas Police officers and even DA Henry Wade drank for free at Ruby’s club. Those authorities, she said, looked the other way when Ruby violated the local liquor laws.

In her testimony for the Warren Commission, Rich claimed that Jack Ruby once assaulted her. She planned to sue Ruby civilly but when she went to police to file a complaint, they refused to take a report on the incident.

In order for Rich to sue Ruby in civil court, it was imperative for there to be a public record of the assault. With police refusing to take the report, there was no way she could prove the assault even took place.

Rich testified that when she threatened to file her complaint with the District Attorney’s Office, she, “wasn’t advised. I was flatly told not to.”

Not only were the police corrupt in taking favors and showing favoritism, they used tactics that were illegal and unethical from a legal standpoint in they way they handled defendants after their arrest. Tactics one would not use in a normal criminal investigation. These were the tactics one would use certainly in a case where they were framing an innocent man.

And they used them on Oswald.

“There is no credible evidence that Ruby sought special favors from police officers or attempted to bribe them.” ( Warren Report, pg. 801 )

Reason # 2 : the way the authorities handled Oswald

Authorities continued to question Oswald after he had asked for an attorney, violating his Constitutional rights under the 5th amendment.

Once Oswald asked for a lawyer, all police-related activities regarding him should have come to a halt. No questioning, no police lineups. Nothing without his lawyer PRESENT. It all should have come to a screeching halt.

“When a suspect in custody asks for a lawyer, from that point on police can not interrogate the suspect at all without an attorney present. It’s not enough to just let the suspect talk to an attorney on the phone. He has to have an attorney present if he has asked for one. That rule remains in effect the entire time the suspect is in custody.” — Jenna Solari, Senior Instructor, Federal Law Enforcemnt Training Center.

Pleas for help

In this video, Oswald repeatedly tells the press he’s being denied counsel and pleads for “someone to come forward to give me legal assistance”.

This was a violation of his Constitutional right to legal counsel under the 6th amendment.

In this video, as the questioning of Oswald continues, Dallas Police Chief Jesse Curry admits that Oswald had previously asked for a lawyer.

Athough Miranda had not yet been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, a citizen’s Constitutional rights begin at birth, not when the Supreme Court decides a case.

Texas law required that a suspect in custody be advised before questioning began that anything he said could be used against him. ( 4 H 216 )

Police claimed that they advised Oswald of his rights, ( ibid. ) but no documentation exists that supports either that claim or that Oswald waived those rights.

In a normal homicide investigation, Oswald would not be interrogated after he asked for a lawyer.

Authorities prevented Oswald from contacting or securing a criminal lawyer

Documents indicate that Oswald was not allowed to use the phone until 1:40 pm on Saturday, the 23rd.

He was allowed to make the call on Saturday afternoon, after police were confident that his chances of reaching his lawyer of choice, New York Attorney John Abt, were slim to none.

Under Texas law, if Oswald did not have a lawyer by the time he was arraigned for the murder of officer J.D. Tippit ( 7pm Friday ), the judge ( Justice of the Peace David Johnston ) should have appointed one to him at that arraignment. ( 7 H 331 )
No such appointment was ever made.

In a normal criminal investigation, Oswald would not have been prevented in contacting or securing counsel on his behalf.

Oswald was held incommunicado on the afternoon and evening of the 22nd

Marina Oswald testified that although she asked to see her husband on the 22nd, she was denied access to him by police. ( 1 H 77 )
Oswald was not allowed to speak with his family in order to prevent him from asking them to obtain a lawyer for him.

In a normal criminal investigation, Oswald would not have been prevented from talking to his family.

Members of the ACLU were dissuaded from speaking to Oswald

Gregory Lee Olds was the President of the Dallas Civil Liberties Union. He had been contacted by one of his board members at 10:30 pm On Friday, the 22nd, regarding Oswald’s being denied counsel.

He called the police station and spoke with Capt. Fritz, who told him that Oswald had been given the opportunity to request counsel and had not made any requests.

After deliberation, Olds and three others headed for Dallas Police Headquarters.

Police lied to the ACLU

Olds and his party arrived on the fourth floor, where they met Charles Webster, a lawyer and professor of law at SMU, who took them in to see Capt. Glen King.
Olds testified that “Captain King ……assured us that Oswald had not made any requests for counsel.” ( 7 H 323 )

Two of the party went downstairs and confronted Judge David Johnston, who gave them a different story. Olds testified that:
“Two of the others, I believe, went downstairs to the basement where Justice of the Peace David Johnston was…… he also assured us that there had been an opportunity of–Oswald’s rights had been explained, and he had declined counsel. Said nothing beyond that. I think that was the extent of our inquiry.” ( ibid. )

There’s a difference between never requesting counsel and being offered counsel and declining it. When you get two different stories from police, one or perhaps both of the sources are lying.

We know that both of these accounts are lies because in his testimony before the WC, Sgt. Gerald Hill said that Oswald had requested counsel at the time of his arrest inside the Texas Theater. ( ibid., pg. 52 )

Later in his testimony, Hill reiterates:
Mr. HILL ………he had previously in the theatre said he wanted his attorney.
Mr. BELIN. He had said this in the theatre ?
Mr. HILL. Yes; when we arrested him, he wanted his lawyer. He knew his rights. ( ibid., pg. 61 )

In a normal criminal investigation, lawyers who attempted to contact Oswald would not have been dissuaded from doing so by the authorities.

Police allowed an attorney of THEIR choice to speak to Oswald

District Attorney Henry Wade had been under pressure from lawyers regarding the treatment of Oswald. One of the issues was Oswald’s repeated public claims that he was not being allowed legal representation.

On Saturday, the 23rd, one of the attorneys who were pressuring Wade contacted H. Louis Nichols, President of the Dallas Bar Association to request that he look into whether or not Oswald had legal representation, wanted legal representation or wanted it but had been denied of it.

Nichols response was to call Henry Wade on the phone and make an inquiry. ( 7 H 327 )
Nichols testified before the Warren Commission that Wade told him that as far as he knew Oswald had not asked for any lawyer so Nichols asked Wade to give Oswald a message that the Dallas Bar Association would provide him with a lawyer if he needed one.

Nichols then called Capt. Glen King of the DPD to ask if Oswald had a lawyer:
“Captain King said that as far as he knew there had been no one representing him, and as far as he knew, Oswald had not asked for a lawyer. He had not asked for the right to call a lawyer, and had not asked that a lawyer be furnished to him—” ( ibid. )

Capt. King offered Nichols the chance to talk to Oswald but Nichols “didn’t know whether I wanted to or not at this point”.
Nichols was reluctant to get involved.
“I didn’t know to what extent I would, or wanted to, or should become embroiled in the facts. I wanted to know whether he needed a lawyer, and I didn’t anticipate that I would be his lawyer, because I don’t practice criminal law.” ( ibid. pg. 331 )

The reluctant lawyer

Nichols’ reluctance to get involved was a point well taken.
To have a civil lawyer go in to question Oswald alone was a joke.
A civil lawyer would never ask the right questions:
Was he being beaten?
Starved?
Deprived of sleep?
Isolated from his friends and family?
Denied counsel?

And there was another reason: Nichols didn’t want to be “embroiled in the facts”. He didn’t want to hear of Oswald’s treatment at the hands of police.

However, Nichols was pressured into going by a law professor from SMU. Nichols’ reluctance to become involved in the issue causes the SMU professor to light a fire under his butt as if to say, “It’s been over 24 hours since his arrest and he hasn’t asked for an attorney yet ?”

Nichols visits Oswald and questions him in the presence of Police Chief Curry.

Oswald complained about his treatment

When Nichols asks Oswald if he had a lawyer, Oswald starts complaining about his treatment:

Mr. NICHOLS. I asked him if he had a lawyer, and he said, “Well, he really didn’t know what it was all about, that he was–had been incarcerated, and kept incommunicado, and I said, “Well, I have come up to see whether or not you want a lawyer, because as I understand–” I am not exactly sure what I ,said there, or whether he said something about not knowing what happened to President Kennedy, or I said that I understood that he was arrested for the shot that killed the President, and I don’t remember who said what after that. This is a little bit vague. ( 7 H 328 )

Here Nichols is having an exclusive talk with the accused assassin of President Kennedy, and he can’t remember what was said in the exchange.

He testified that, “I was interested in knowing whether or not he had a lawyer and whether or not he had requested a lawyer and been refused….. I didn’t go into the other questions, or whether or not he wanted to see his family and hadn’t been permitted. I really was concerned about whether or not he had a lawyer or wanted a lawyer, or whether we had any obligations to furnish him one. ( ibid., pg. 330 )

In addition, when Oswald asked for John Abt or a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union, Nichols told him that he didn’t know Abt and he didn’t know any lawyers who were members of the ACLU but admitted under oath that “as it turned out later, a number of lawyers I know ARE members”. ( ibid. pg. 329 )

What a surprise.

Nichols went before the media and announced that Oswald refused his help

Nichols then went before the media and stated that Oswald had “turned down my offer for help”. ( ibid. pg. 330 )

Nichols mentioned to the press Oswald’s request for John Abt or the American Civil Liberties Union. But he never mentioned to the press Oswald’s complaint of being held “incommunicado”.

There may have been a reason that Nichols was reluctant to get involved in this case. He had a bias that made him a puppet for the Dallas authorities who were pushing a narrative that Oswald did not want legal counsel.

According to his own testimony, Nichols was “connected” to the Dallas Police and the City of Dallas. Nichols used to work for the city attorney’s office, and at the time of Oswald’s incarceration, still represented the city credit union and had a brother on the police force, so, he had known many of these city authorities for years. ( 7 H 327 )

Having the city as a client and a brother on the police force, gave Nichols a bias that made him understandably hestitant to get involved and a reluctance to go against the police narrative.

Even when he found out how Oswald was being treated, he hid that from the press.

But his announcement to the press did more than settle the issue of whether or not Oswald wanted legal assistance.

The ACLU dropped its plan to visit Oswald on Saturday night

Gregory Olds of the ACLU told the Commission that the visit of Dallas Bar Association President H. Louis Nichols to speak with Oswald on Saturday went a long way in reassuring Olds’ questions about suspected denial of counsel to Oswald:

Mr. OLDS. Mr. Nichols went down late this afternoon, I think around 5:30, and he reported after that that he had seen Oswald in respect to the same reasons that we had for going down there Saturday night, to see if he wanted some sort of legal representation, and to make sure whether or not he was denied—being denied it, and he said that he was satisfied that–in essence, Oswald told Nichols he was satisfied with the situation. ( ibid., pg. 325 )

The Dallas ACLU was afraid of the Dallas Police. The ACLU should have demanded to see Oswald. They didn’t even ask.

Olds testified that, “…I have always been sorry that we didn’t talk with Oswald, because it wasn’t clear whether we would be permitted to see him that night or not.”

Permitted to see him ? Police can’t deny lawyers from speaking to suspects. That’s a Constitutional right — to speak to an attorney.

Mr. STERN. But you did not ask to see him ?

Mr. OLDS. No we did not, which I think was a mistake on my part. ( 7 H 324 )

Nichols’ public statement that Oswald had denied his help was all the fearful ACLU needed as an excuse to dissuade it from contacting Oswald.

But it also damaged Oswald’s chance of obtaining counsel outside of Dallas as well.

Police took advantage of the absence of a lawyer

In one of the more blatant examples of police misconduct, the Dallas Police constructed lineups unfairly. These lineups should never have taken place without Oswald’s lawyer present. But without a lawyer to make sure the lineups were done fairly, police were free to construct lineups which made Oswald the only choice a witness could make.

In the first two lineups, Oswald was displayed with a dark-skinned 34 year old detective wearing a brown sport coat, a 31 year old blond detective wearing a white short-sleeved shirt and a red vest, and a short, heavy jail clerk wearing a grey woolen sweater. In addition, Oswald was handcuffed to the two detectives.

Lineup # 3, saw Oswald displayed with two prisoners who happened to be blond and the same jail clerk wearing the same grey woolen sweater.
Lineup # 4, saw Oswald displayed with two teenagers and a Mexican.

No witness who saw Tippit’s murderer ever described him as:
being in his mid-30s and dark skinned, or
blond and wearing a red vest, or
short and heavy and wearing a grey woolen sweater or
being a Mexican.

In fact, Detective Perry’s dark skin was noted by witness Sam Guinyard in his testimony that the men in the lineup were not the same color. ( 7 H 399 )

This left the battered, bruised and handcuffed Oswald as the only choice the witness could make. Police would never have gotten away with this kind of unfair display had Oswald’s lawyer been present.

In its Report, the Warren Commission said, “The Commission is satisfied that the lineups were conducted fairly.” ( Report, pg. 169 )

In a normal criminal investgation, the “fillers” in the police lineup would have either resembled the descriptions of the eyewitnesses to the Tippit murder, or resembled Oswald.

No recording or transcription of the interrogation sessions was made

There was no valid reason why the interrogations sessions were not recorded. Even if there wasn’t a tape recorder available in the whole state of Texas, a court stenographer could have been utilized to take down what was said.

The reason to NOT record them would be to prevent anyone other than those present in the room from knowing what was said by the suspect during his interrogation and what was done to him.
Without a recording or transcript of what was being said, it allowed the authorities to create a hearsay narrative that was based on their word and their word alone.

In a normal criminal investigation, the interrogation sessions would have either been tape recorded, or a court stenographer would have been brought in to do transcription.

Police arraigned Oswald for the assassination at 1:35am on Saturday

This tactic is referred to in interrogation circles as “sleep deprivation”. It is a form of torture.

Its use by police is illegal and a violation of a suspect’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.

Another problem is, there was no court stenographer present during the arraignment ( 4 H 156 ). The absence of a court stenographer meant that there would be no record of what was said during the proceedings.

But we do know that after the charges of killing the President were read to him, Oswald replied, “that’s ridiculous”. ( CD 87, pg. 549 )

In a normal criminal investigation, Oswald would have appeared before a judge in the courthouse first thing Monday morning. He would have been arraigned at that time and provided with counsel if he had none.

Police stubbornly kept to their announced transfer time

Normally, the police would take ANY and ALL security precautions necessary to protect their prisoner and see to it that he was safely transferred into the custody of the County Sheriff.

But not this time.

Police had made public the time of Oswald’s transfer, a tactic counterproductive to the safety of the prisoner.

Dallas Secret Service head Forrest Sorrels testified that, “when I heard they were supposed to take him out at 10 o’clock — that was the announcement and so forth on the radio and the papers — I remarked to Captain Fritz that if I were he, I would not remove Oswald from the city hall or city jail to the county jail at an announced time; that I would take him out at 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning when there was no one around.” ( 13 H 63 )

Of course, making public the time of Oswald’s transfer in a city crying for revenge for the assassination was a foolish move. Or it could be a ploy in hopes that some vigilante would take Oswald out.

DA Henry Wade wanted to move Oswald on Friday evening, but was told by Capt. Fritz that Sheriff Bill Decker, “did not like for prisoners to be moved in the nighttime.” ( CD 4, pg. 32 )

Sheriff Decker wanted to move Oswald Saturday night

Whether Decker liked moving prisoners at night or not, he was under the impression that the move would be made Saturday evening. He had made arrangements for the transfer at that time and around 9 pm was shocked to learn from a reporter that the move had been scheduled for 10 am Sunday morning. ( 12 H 47 )

He called the police station to protest the time of the transfer and was told that Oswald, “wouldn’t be moved that night and that’s all there is to it.” ( ibid., pg. 49 )

But something happened later that evening that caused Decker to lobby once again for an earlier transfer.

The phone threat

After 12:30 on Sunday morning, Decker was advised at home by his office that the FBI had notified them of a death threat against Oswald.
He called the Police station and advised that Oswald should be transferred immediately ( 12 H 49 ). Since it was Chief Curry’s plan to move Oswald at 10am Sunday morning, police said that they would check with the Chief.

Sometime between 3 and 4 am, not having heard back from the Dallas Police via the Sheriff, the FBI directly contacted Capt. W.B. Frazier of the police dept.. Capt Frazier was the shift commander in charge at that time. The agent who contacted him, Newsom, was never called to give testimony.

Finally, Capt. Frazier tried to contact Chief Curry at 5:45 am, but could not contact the Chief because his phone was off the hook. ( 12 H 54 )

Frazier testified that he was preparing to send a cruiser by Chief Curry’s house when he was relieved by Capt. Talbert. Talbert sent a cruiser to notify the Chief. At 6:30 am, Curry called the police station and was notified by Talbert of the threat.

Curry’s instructions were to tell the sheriff and the FBI that he would be in his office at 8:30 or 9:00 am and would call them at that time. ( 21 H 660 )

This was 6 hours AFTER Decker called the police dept. to transfer Oswald immediately.

The phone threat to the Dallas Police

On the night before Oswald’s transfer, Dallas Police officer Billy Grammar worked the front desk and received a death threat against Oswald over the phone.

It seems that there was a reluctance on the part of the police to wake Chief Curry. Perhaps his getting a good night’s sleep had priority over the safety of the prisoner.
Or that the police department was just not interested in protecting the prisoner.

There is a reluctance on the part of Chief Curry at the time of his notification, to set in motion the events necessary to move the prisoner immediately. Instead he made it known that he would not be available for another 2 or 2 1/2 hours.

In any event, the Chief made sure that Oswald was not going to be transferred at any other time.
Regardless of any threats.

In a normal homicide investigation, every step would have been taken to insure the safety of the suspect.

Reason # 3: the way the authorities handled the evidence

To prove someone guilty, a prosecutor must prove that the evidence presented in court is the same evidence that was recovered at the scene of an alleged crime.

He or she must be able to show that the evidence was handled properly and was not contaminated or tampered with.

If law enforcement does not properly handle evidence, the evidence can be challenged on the grounds that it was tampered with, that test results are faulty or inaccurate, or that evidence was planted at the scene of a crime.

In a typical case, a police officer will collect evidence at the crime scene and give it to a forensics technician. The technician then analyzes the evidence, documenting any tests that were performed on the evidence.

When he has finished testing the evidence, he turns it over to an evidence clerk, who stores the evidence until it is needed for another test or to be presented at trial.

Establishing a chain of custody through an evidence log

To prove the evidence was not tampered with, law enforcement must be able to identify, at all times in the chain of custody, a particular person who is in control of a piece of evidence. This is done through an evidence log.

A typical evidence log will include the date and time the evidence was collected, the name of the investigator, the location where the evidence was collected, the reason the evidence was collected, relevant serial numbers, a description of the evidence, and the method that was used to collect the evidence.

The log should also include signatures of the people who were in possession of the evidence, the date and time the evidence was transferred, the manner in which the evidence was transferred, and the security conditions while the evidence was being handled or stored.

If there are any discrepancies in the chain of custody and law enforcement cannot prove who had the evidence at a particular time, the chain of custody is broken and the defendant can ask to have the evidence declared inadmissible.

The chain of custody can be broken if a custody form is labeled incorrectly, if a transfer of evidence takes an unreasonable amount of time, or if there is reason to believe the evidence was tampered with.

In this case, there’s plenty of reason to believe that the evidence was tampered with.

No evidence logs were used for ANY of the evidence in this case

From the weapons to the spent shells to the paper “gunsack” to the fingerprints to the jacket found in the parking lot, no evidence logs were ever implemented for any of the major pieces of evidence in this case.

Evidence logs are used to establish a chain of custody of the evidence.

The chain of custody begins at the point of discovery. The lack of evidence logs leaves a void in the chain of custody at the point of discovery for much of the evidence in this case. If the chain of custody is broken, the evidence becomes inadmissable.

Chain of custody problems

For example, the first four persons who handled the now famous “stretcher bullet”, including the person who found it, could not identify CE 399 as the bullet they handled.

That means that the chain of custody of the “magic bullet”, CE 399, begins with the fifth person who allegedly handled it, an FBI agent in Washington.

None of the three witnesses who found the four spent shells at the Tippit murder scene, could identify the shells currently in evidence as the shells they found. In addition, the officer who marked the shells at the scene, when shown the shells currently in evidence, could not find his mark on those shells.

As a result of the inability to establish the chain of custody for those four shells at the time of discovery, the chain of custody for those shells found at the Tippit murder scene begins with the second or third person who allegedly handled them.

Another problem with the chain of custody of these shells is that three of the four shells contain markings that do not correspond to any known person in the alleged chain of custody. The two Remington-Peters shells contain the initials “RD” and one of the Winchester-Western shells contain the initials “DC” or “DO”. These are not the markings or initials of anyone in the known chain of custody of the shells.

With all the problems with the chain of custody of these shells, it’s hard to imagine any of them being admitted as evidence in court, but the Warren Commission seems to have had no standard by which it accepted evidence.

More chain of custody problems

The probability of evidence tampering becomes more evident whe you take into account that the shells recovered from the Tippit murder scene do not match the bullets removed from Off. Tippit’s body.

The three spent rifle shells recovered from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository were allegedly removed from the scene by Det. Richard Sims, although he testified that he never took possession of them. ( 7 H 163 )

And the person who foundOswald’s jacketunder a car in a parking lot was never identified. The discovery was attributed to police Capt. W.W. Westbrook, but he testified that he was NOT the one who found it. ( 7 H 115 )

The evidence logs are significant because the normal procedure is for the first person who handles the evidence to initiate the log. The log is required to establish the chain of custody which may be challenged by the defense at trial.

Since all of the physical evidence was collected on November 22nd, the evidence logs SHOULD have been filled out at that time. The fact that the case never went to trial is irrelevant to the existence of the evidence logs because the evidence log is filled out at the time of discovery, not during the trial.

The absence of evidence logs, the breaks in the chain of custody, and the inconsistencies in the evidence, created an opportunity for authorities to tamper with that evidence.

But there was another way that could prove the evidence authentic: if the persons who discovered the items were able to positively identify the items currently in evidence as the items they found.

Witnesses who found items could not positively identify the items currently in evidence as the items they found

Much of the evidence against Oswald, from the rifle to the spent shells found at the Tippit murder scene, was found by someone other than the Dallas Police.

One would expect that given the mandate of the Katzenbach memo that required that, “the evidence was such that he ( Oswald ) would have been convicted at trial”, the authorities would have been particularly diligent in their handling of the evidence.
This was not so.

In fact, Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone, who found the rifle on the sixth floor, could not identify CE 139 as the rifle he found. ( 3 H 294 )

Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney, credited with finding the three spent rifle shells on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building, was never shown the shells currently in evidence and asked to identify them. Instead, he was shown a crime scene photograph and asked if the shells in the photograph were the shells he found. ( 3 H 286 )

That’s ridiculous.

As I’ve already mentioned, the four spent .38 shells found at the Tippit murder scene were found by witnesses, not police. And when shown the shells currently in evidence, NONE of those witnesses could identify those shells as the shells they found.

Without the positive identification of the people who found them and combined with the lack of an evidence log, the authenticity of this “evidence” as being authentic is in serious doubt.

Elm St. was a crime scene that may have contained evidence and should have been sealed off

Another shortcoming of the way police handled the evidence was that certain crime scenes were not immediately secured. This allowed for the crime scenes to be contaminated and potential evidence to be lost.

This is a common procedure at a crime scene: secure the scene and then start processing it. At least two crime scenes were never secured. One of those was Dealey Plaza.

A photograph taken after the assassination shows that traffic was allowed access to Elm St. just 10 minutes after the assassination.

How does that happen ? Who ordered Elm St. open to traffic ?
Dealey Plaza was a crime scene and traffic should have been detoured away from Elm St. until police had an opportunity to fully process the scene.

Police should have searched the plaza for missed bullets with metal detectors, if necessary. If anything was found, it should have been photographed in place, marked and secured. The same goes with pieces of the President’s skull. Precise measurements should have been taken to pinpoint the exact place where the evidence landed.

Police failed to secure the Tippit murder scene as well

Likewise, the site of the other murder, the Tippit murder scene, was not secured. Witnesses found and even handled the spent shells. This never should have been allowed.
In addition, crime scene photographs show bystanders within feet of the Tippit police cruiser.

The failure to secure the crime scenes allowed them to become contaminated.
Crime scene contamination was not the only problem this case had.

Police failed to photograph evidence they claim to have found

Pieces of evidence which police claimed to have found were never photographed in place.

Police claimed to have found a paper “gunsack” in the sixth floor “sniper’s nest”, but the crime scene photographs show no such thing.

Police claimed to have found “Oswald’s jacket” under a car in a parking lot a block from the Tippit murder scene, but never photographed it as found.

Not only did police not provide photographic proof of the evidence they said they found, once evidence was in their hands, they handled it in a most haphazard way.

Police failed to secure evidence they collected

One example of how the Dallas Police mishandled evidence is with the three spent shells found on the sixth floor.
Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney was the one who found the shells. he told the Warren Commission that, “Capt. Fritz picked up the cartridges, began to examine them.” ( 3 H 289 )

This is highly irregular for an experienced chief of homicide division, to contaminate a crime scene. By picking those shells up before his ID Bureau had a chance to dust them for fingerprints, he ruined any chance they might have of retrieving prints from the shells.

Lt. Day testified that after he had processed them at the scene, “the three hulls were not marked at that time. Mr. Sims ( Detective Richard Sims ) took possession of them.” ( 4 H 253, 4 H 257 ) Day said that he put the three shells in an envelope and marked the envelope with his name and date. ( ibid. )
He further testified that he placed the shells in an envelope that was not sealed and when he got the envelope back that evening at 10pm, the envelope was still unsealed. ( 4 H 256 )

Having been placed in an unsealed envelope that remained unsealed, offered an opportunity for police to tamper with the evidence by substituting 6.5 shells for the shells found on the sixth floor.

The validity of any criminal case depends on the credibility of those bringing that case to trial.

These three reasons: the corruption of the prosecutorial system, the way the authorities handled Oswald and the way the authorities handled the evidence should be enough to give anyone pause about the validity of the case against him.
There was also the way the authorities handled the witnesses.

Reason # 4: the way the authorities handled the witnesses

Another reason to doubt the authenticity of the Warren Commission’s case against Oswald is in the way authorities handled the witnesses. Witnesses who had no evidence were called. Other key witnesses were ignored. Witnesses reported to the Commission that they were harassed, intimidated and threatened with jail time. Others reported that statements attributed to them in reports were not what they said. One witness told the House Select Committee on Assassinations that his life was threatened by an FBI agent.

The calling of witnesses who had no evidence

57,224 questions, or 52.05 % of the total questions asked, were asked of people with no direct knowledge of the crime. This included Ruth Paine, Curtis LaVerne Crafard, George Senator, Marina Oswald, Robert Oswald, John Edward Pic, Andrew Armstrong and George DeMohrenschildt.

Witnesses Robert Oswald and John Pic, Oswald’s brother and half-brother, had not seen Lee Harvey in the year before the assassination. Yet they were called to give testimony.

The Commission asked more questions ( 104 ) of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and diplomat Llewellyn Thompson, neither of whom had any knowledge regarding the shooting at General Walker or killings of Kennedy, Tippit or Oswald than it asked autopsy doctor Boswell ( 14 ).

The Commission asked more questions of Mahlon Tobias, Oswald’s landlord in Dallas, about how the Oswalds lived ( 229 ), than it did of the chief autopsy pathologist, Dr. James Humes ( 215 ).

It asked more questions of the emcee at Ruby’s strip joint, William D. Crowe, Jr. ( 342 ), than it did of the JFK autopsy doctors TOTAL . ( 304 )

The Commission asked more questions ( 70 ) of Mrs. Anne Boudreaux, who knew a woman who babysat Lee Harvey Oswald when he was 2 1/2 years old, than it asked Warren Caster ( 32 ) , the man who brought two rifles into the School Book Depository building just two days before the President’s motorcade.

The ignoring of key witnesses

The Commission ignored important witnesses who HAD evidence to present. For example, the President’s personal physician, Admiral George Burkley, the only medical professional who was with the body BOTH in Trauma Room 1 at Parkland Hospital AND the morgue at Bethesda Naval Hospital, was never called to give testimony.
Why not ?

Six witnesses who either saw, handled or in whose care the Walker bullet was, were never called to give testimony.

Why not ?

Witnesses who claimed to see smoke come out from the trees near the picket fence up on the grassy knoll were among those whose accounts were either ignored or never called to testify.

Why not ?

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover went so far as to order the Dallas FBI office to NOT interview certain witnesses.

The ignoring of key witnesses in this case, combined with the calling witnesses who had no evidence to contribute, is bad enough. But there is also evidence that witnesses were harassed and threatened with jail time.

Evidence of harassment and threats against witnesses

One example of witness coercion comes from the testimony of W.W. Litchfield II, who told the FBI that he saw a man who looked like Oswald in the Carousel Club.
He told the Commission that the FBI threats definitely had an effect on how he answered their questions:

“…..And then the fact that when the Federal agents talked to me, they said, “You know, if you say you are positive and it wasn’t him,” it’s a Federal charge, and I said, “Well, I’m not that positive.”

Mr. HUBERT. The Federal agent told you if you gave an opinion—
Mr. LITCHFIELD. No; they said, “If you give false information as to an exact statement–” not an opinion, but if I say I’m positive, that’s a statement.

Mr. HUBERT. But, what has caused you to weaken in your opinion it was Oswald, as you tell it to me, is the fact that you got the impression that if you gave a positive identification and it proved to be false, that it would be a Federal offense, is that correct ?
Mr. LITCHFIELD. Yes; they said giving false information to the FBI, and I’m not 100 percent pure positive. I say, “It bears a close resemblance,” and this is all I can say.

Mr. HUBERT. And that’s all you did tell them ?
Mr. LITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; that’s the statement I signed. ( 14 H 107-108 )

The FBI used threats against witnesses who were sure of what they saw to make them appear less sure in the official record.
This same tactic was used on witnesses who said they were “positive” that the man they saw was not Oswald.

Why federal agents were present at different locations

This is why Federal agents were present during the questioning of witnesses at several different locations including the Tippit murder scene, the Dallas Police station and the Texas Theater, when the FBI had no legal jurisdiction in any of these crimes.

They were there to hear, question and intimidate witnesses.

These tactics seemed to work. Original stories like the one of Charles Givens, who at first said he saw Oswald on the first floor at 11:50 and then said he hadn’t seen Oswald all morning.

Or Domingo Benavides, who was 15 feet away from the Tippit killer but was afraid of not being able to identify the killer if he said he could, so he declined to view a lineup.

But in the case of Marina Oswald, the threat was to deport her if she didn’t “cooperate” with the “investigation”. Deportation would have meant that she would have gone back to Russia without her kids, who were American citizens by birth. She’d go, they’d stay. The threat of losing her children would have been enough to make ANY mother tell them what they wanted to hear. True or not.

Federal agents intimidate Marina Oswald

More evidence of FBI intimidation and threats of witnesses comes no less from Oswald’s brother Robert, who told the Commission that he overheard the FBI threaten to deport Marina Oswald if she did not cooperate with them.

Mr. OSWALD. In my presence. And the tone of the reply between this gentle man and Mr. Gopadze, and back to Marina, it was quite evident there was a harshness there, and that Marina did not want to speak to the FBI at that time. And she was refusing to. They were insisting, sir.

And they implied in so many words, as I sat there–if I might state–with Secret Service Agent Gary Seals, of Mobile, Ala.–we were opening the first batch of mail that had come to Marina and Lee’s attention, and we were perhaps just four or five feet away from where they were attempting this interview, and it came to my ears that they were implying that if she did not cooperate with the FBI agent there, that this would perhaps–I say, again, I am implying–in so many words, that they would perhaps deport her from the United States and back to Russia. ( 1 H 410 )

The man from immigration

The FBI even brought an agent from the Immigration and Naturalization Service all the way from New York into the Inn at Six Flags ( where Marina was to be kept incommunicado for two months ) to scare Marina and “advise her to help” the FBI:

Mr. RANKIN. Did you see anyone from the Immigration Service during this period of time ?
Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who that was ?
Mrs. OSWALD. I don’t remember the name. I think he is the chairman of that office. At least he was a representative of that office.
Mr. RANKIN. By “that office” you mean the one at Dallas ?
Mrs. OSWALD. I was told that he had especially come from New York, it seems to me.

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say to you ?
Mrs. OSWALD. That if I was not guilty of anything, if I had not committed any crime against this Government, then I had every right to live in this country. This was a type of introduction before the questioning by the FBI. He even said that it would be better for me if I were to help them.
Mr. RANKIN. Did he explain to you what he meant by being better for you ?
Mrs. OSWALD. In the sense that I would have more rights in this country. I understood it that way. ( 1 H 80 )

Of course, no citizen has more rights than anyone else. Marina’s understanding was based on what she was being told by a translator.

Why bring a man from Immigration all the way to Dallas from New York if deportation was not an issue here ?

Intimidation of other witnesses

Litchfield and Marina Oswald were not the only witnesses who revealed that they had been coerced by authorities.
Richard Randolph Carr witnessed a man who he claimed he saw in the sixth floor window, “walking very fast” on Houston St. after the shooting.

He said that he saw the man get into a “grey 61 or 62 Rambler station wagon which was parked just north of Commerce near Record St.”. He added that, “the station wagon, which had Texas license and was driven by a young negro man, drove off northerly direction.” ( Oswald 201 file, Vol. 25, pg. 70 )

During the Clay Shaw trial, Carr testified that as a result of talking to the FBI, “I done as I was instructed. I shut my mouth.” ( Carr testimony in Shaw trial, pg. 20 )

Mrs. Acquilla Clemons, a witness to the Tippit murder who said she saw TWO men flee from the scene and neither one was Oswald, was advised by a “man with a gun” that “it was better if she didn’t say anything”.

Intimidation was not the only tactic used by the FBI in this case. There is at least one example of where the FBI threatened to kill a witness if the witness testified to the Warren Commission a certain way.

Witness’ life threatened by FBI agent

Orest Pena was the owner of the Habana Bar in New Orleans. His bar was a social point for anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the city.
Pena was also a “confidential source” for the New Orleans FBI office.

Pena had seen Lee Harvey Oswald in his bar with an FBI agent named Warren C. DeBrueys. DeBrueys found out that Pena was to be called to give testimony to the Warren Commission.

Pena testified to the House Select Committee on Assassinations that DeBrueys told him, “about a week or ten days more or less before I went to testify to the Warren Commission that, “if I talk about him he will get rid of my ass.”

Pena told the HSCA that he tried to tell the Warren Commission of this and DeBruey’s connection to the training camps but that, “Mr. Liebeler did not cooperate with me and did not let me talk.” ( above )

Frustrated that Commission counsel showed no interest in what he was saying, Pena told the HSCA that he decided that, “I might as well keep my mouth shut”. ( ibid. )

Intimidation and threats were not the only tactics the authorities used to control the narrative.
There is strong evidence that official reports and documents, including affidavits taken from witnesses, were falsified.

Evidence that witness statements were altered

Subsequent investigations have revealed in testimony and in video that authorities altered witness statements and affdavits.
In at least one case, an affidavit was signed by someone who was not the affiant.

During their Warren Commission testimony, witnesses Robert Edwards, Buell Frazier, Michael Paine and James Worrell, were all asked by counsel about comments attributed to them in reports and affidavits. All testified that they never made the comments attributed to them.

Witness B.M. Patterson swore in an affdavit that a report saying that he was shown a picture of Lee Harvey Oswald and identified Oswald as the man he saw was in error. He testified that he was never shown a picture of Oswald. He asked that the last paragraph of that report be stricken from the record.

It was never stricken from the record and remains part of the public record on the assassination as Patterson Exhibit A.

More alterations

In this video from 2010, I compare the statements on the public record from witnesses such as James L. Simmons, Richard C. Dodd and J.C. Price, to what they told Mark Lane they told authorities.

During his investigation of Clay Shaw, New Orleans DA Jim Garrison showed witnesses their statements on the public record. Witnesses such as Jean Hill and Julia Ann Mercer said that those statements did not reflect what they told authorities.

Hill told Garrison that she was berated by authorities when she tried to tell what she saw. She told him and that her testimony was a, “fabrication from beginning to end.”

Mercer went so far as to tell Garrison that the signature on the affidavit she gave was not hers. She added that the female notary public who signed her affidavit had not been present when she gave that affidavit. This is significant because it is a requirement by law.

Neither the Warren Commission nor the House Select Committee on Assassinations ever looked into these multiple allegations of altered statements and affidavits.
They completely ignored the possibility of criminal behavior by authorities in this case.

In a normal criminal investigation, witnesses who had no evidence would not have been called. Key witnesses would not have been ignored. Witnesses would not have been threatened, harassed or coerced. They would not have had their statements altered and their sworn affidavits forged.

Reason # 5 : The Commission’s own tests proved its conclusions were wrong

In this 31-minute video, I show how the rifle tests proved that the Depository rifle, CE 139, could not have been the murder weapon.

Not only did the rifle tests show that the CE 139 rifle was not the murder weapon. The wounds ballistics tests showed that the rifle’s ammunition exhibited more damage than the Commission’s Exhibit 399 did and the wounds from that ammunition were nowhere similar to the wounds of the victims.

The wounds ballistics tests completely destroyed the Single Bullet Theory.

Conclusion

My experience in the criminal justice system allows me to see when a case is legitimate and when it is not.

IMO, this case against Oswald was NOT legitimate.

The Dallas prosecutorial system was known for framing innocent people for crimes they did not commit. This was revealed in 2005 when the Innocence Project of Texas successfully got the newly-elected Dallas DA to look at some convictions of Henry Wade’s.

It was found that Wade’s office was more interested in convicting the person ARRESTED than the actual perpetrator of the crime. As a result, 19 of Wade’s convictions were overturned on DNA evidence.

That means that at least 19 people were framed by the Dallas Police and Dallas DA for crimes they did not commit.

From the continued questioning of Oswald after he “lawyered up”, to the refusal to allow him legal representation, to the unfair police lineups without his lawyer present, to the lack of security for the prisoner after receiving death threats, the way the authorities handled Oswald was not consistent with how a normal criminal investigation would have been handled.

It was, however, consistent with how you would handle a case if you were trying to convict an innocent man of a crime he did not commit. It also was consistent with keeping an innocent man from going to trial and guaranteeing that the “so-called evidence” that he warned his brother not to believe, would never be challenged in court.

Police “failures”

Crime scenes like Dealey Plaza and the Tippit murder scene were not secured and adequately processed. Were the police that inept that they didn’t know how to secure a crime scene ?

Evidence was not properly secured. Did the police not know enough to seal evidence to avoid tampering and maintain the integrity of the evidence ?

Descriptions of evidence were initially misidentified and had to be revised. Were the police that stupid that they couldn’t read the identification of the rifle or .38 shells ?

Were the police that inept that they didn’t know how to photograph evidence in place ? They couldn’t tell the color of a jacket ?

The answer ot these questions is a resounding, “NO”. The police demonstrated that they knew enough to secure a crime scene when they secured the “sniper’s nest” and sealed the Texas Theater. They demonstrated that they knew enough to photograph evidence in place whe they photographed the three shells on the sixth floor and the rifle.

So what are we to think about these police “failures” ? Were the police that stupid, or were these “failures” by design ? Were they “dumb like a fox”, or just plain dumb ?

But the police were not the only ones who “mishandled” the case.

The FBI coverup

Chains of custody of much of the evidence in the case did not start at the point of discovery. In the case of Commission Exhibit 399, the chain of custody began with the fifth person to handle it, an FBI agent in Washington, D.C..

Many of the items currently in the possession of the government and marked as evidence, which were found by witnesses, were never identified by those witnesses as the items they found.

Once the FBI, who had no jurisdiction to investigate the crime, took it over, Hoover covered up the Dallas Police’s false arrest and ensured that JFK would never get the justice he deserved. Hoover went so far as to order the Dallas FBI to NOT interview certain witnesses who had evidence of Oswald’s innocence.

The FBI also lied in their reports about what the witnesses said. When asked under oath, witnesses testified that they never said what the FBI reports said they said.

All witness statements and affidavits should be complete, concise and correct.

The “smoking gun”

And therein lies the smoking gun of Oswald’s innocence: the way the authorities handled the case is evidence that Oswald was not guilty.

  1. The prosecutorial system in Dallas was corrupt.
  2. How the authorities handed the defendant ( Oswald ).
  3. The way the authorities handled the evidence.
  4. How the authorities handled the witnesses.
  5. The Commission’s own tests proved the crime could not have been done as they concluded.

In normal criminal investigations, you don’t:

  • Deny a suspect counsel
  • Continue to question him after he’s “lawyered up”.
  • Keep him from speaking to his family
  • Arraign him at 1:35 in the morning
  • Arrange police lineups in such a way as to make him the only choice
  • Tell witnesses that the perp is in the lineup
  • Fail to secure crime scenes
  • Neglect to photograph certain evidence as found
  • Fingerprint a dead corpse the day after you fingerprinted him alive
  • Dust the same item for fingerprints TWICE
  • Fail to fill out evidence logs and establish a chain of custody for the evidence
  • Misidentify evidence that’s clearly marked
  • Falsify sworn affidavits and have someone other than the affiant sign them
  • Alter witness statements
  • Threaten, coerce and ignore witnesses

These are not tactics one would use in a normal criminal investigation, but they are tactics that would be used in a murder case where the suspect is innocent, the evidence has been tampered with and it is the intent of the authorities to frame him for crimes he did not commit.

A final thought

Oswald was a dead man the second he was arrested in the Texas Theater. The framing of him as President Kennedy’s assassin and the murderer of Officer J.D. Tippit and the mainstream media’s acceptance of it continues to be a national disgrace.

Once free and independent from government control, the American press was once the investgative arm of the American people.

To its credit, the foreign press was the first to see and report the truth: this was a political murder and the motive was political. The assassination of President Kennedy returned the power of the Presidency to the right-wing power elite that controlled it prior to the 1960 election.

This was not the work of a foreign power, this was the work of a domestic conspiracy.
Who had the power to pull it off ?
The one organization with allies in the Secret Service, the US Military and the Dallas Police.
An organization behind the training camps where Cuban gunmen could train under the guise of a “second invasion of Cuba”.
The organization whose track record included assassinations of heads of state.
And an organization who had the power over the FBI via its blackmailing of Hoover.

This was not a Mafia killing.

Jim Garrison was right in one sense. This murder was orchestrated by elements within the CIA who preferred Johnson as President. I believe the gunmen were Cuban exiles opposed to Kennedy’s policies on Cuba. The CIA’s political allies in the Secret Service facilitated the killing and it was sanctioned by the US Military. Johnson and Hoover then covered up the crime.

In the end, karma was served to Johnson in the form of the Vietnam War, which became an albatross to his administration and forced him to not run for a second term in 1968.